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Harmonizing Global Constitutionalism  
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh 
Abstract 
The explosion in the literature on global constitutionalism in recent times has come at the cost of  ever more, 
and more diverse, definitions of the concept of constitutionalism.  The state of the current debate can  
therefore be characterised, conceptually speaking, as a ‘constitutional cacophony’.  This cacophony is 
arguably the inevitable result of the ‘problems of translation’ in importing the state-based concept of 
constitutionalism to the global level.   This article attempts to counter suprastate constitutional scepticism  
borne of these problems of translation and resulting cacophony by revisiting the concept of 
constitutionalism itself through the lens of legitimacy.    Arguing that legitimacy provides both a key 
element of the concept of constitutionalism as well as a common denominator for the application of 
constitutionalism both at the state and suprastate levels, it develops a conception of ‘constitutionalism as 
legitimacy’ as a way of vindicating the role of constitutionalism in the context of global governance.  It 
presents constitutionalism as a discursive ‘mixed’ form of legitimacy entailing both  factual and normative 
components involving a series of contestable reasons for the legitimacy of an authority based on a blend of 
liberalism and republicanism.  These theories are then reworked into a framework of reasons for the 
legitimacy of an authority centring around its origins, its aims and its methods.  Tracing the relationship 
between constitutionalism and legitimacy in this way brings harmony to the global constitutional 
cacophony and allows for a plausible ‘translation’ of the concept of constitutionalism between the state and 
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suprastate levels allowing for an effective ‘mapping’ and ‘shaping’ of legitimacy in global governance which 
is illustrated by reference to the legitimacy crisis surrounding the United Nations Security Council’s ‘war on 
terror’. 
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I. Introduction: The Global Constitutional Cacophony  
The idea of using the concept of constitutionalism to understand global order is hardly  new, dating at 
least as far back as the early twentieth century when scholars of the ‘Vienna School’ laid the conceptual 
foundations of a proto-global constitutionalism based on the unity of (positive) law and state and 
international legal orders.1  However, inspired by the success of constitutional discourse at the European 
Union level, and reacting to the end of the Cold War, the increasing institutionalization of international 
relations and the onward march of economic globalization, the concept of constitutionalism has been 
undergoing a renaissance in international legal literature 2 as well as making headway in international 
relations.3  Unlike the relatively limited ambition of the former ‘wave’ of global constitutionalism, the remit 
and ambition of the idea in contemporary scholarship is considerably broader, reflecting the significant 
changes to global ordering in the intervening, particularly post-war, years.  
Read any tract in the burgeoning literature on global constitutionalism, however, and you will 
invariably be met with a definition of some sort.  Frequently this will be at, or near, the beginning of the 
piece, where the conceptual ground is swept clean, a bespoke definition of constitutionalism advanced, 
and armed with this definition, a particular area or corner of global governance duly analysed, or the use of 
constitutionalism in the context of global governance duly critiqued.4   Given that this exercise is replicated 
                                                                 
1 J L Kunz, ‘The “Vienna School” and International Law’ (1933) 11 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 370 , F Rigaux, ‘Hans Kelsen on 
International Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 325 –343; T Kleinlein, ‘Alfred Verdross as a Founding 
Father of International Constitutionalism?’ (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of International Law 385–416 
2 The literature is too great to cite with any completeness here. Some representative examples include R. St. John 
Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism, Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005); J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International 
Law, (OUP, Oxford, 2009); JL Dunoff and JP Tractman (eds), Ruling the World?  Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance (CUP, Cambridge, 2009); A Peters and K Armingeon (eds), ‘Special Issue:  Symposium:   Global 
Constitutionalism – Process and Substance’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 385;  A Wiener, A 
Lang, J Tully, M Poiares Maduro and M Kumm, ‘Editorial:  Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, democracy and the 
rule of law’ (2012) 1:1 Global Constitutionalism 1-15. 
3 A. Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics:  Contested Norms and International Encounters (CUP, Cambridge, 
2008), S. Gill  and A Claire Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order (CUP, Cambridge, 2015). 
4 See for example D. Bodansky, ‘Is There an International Environmental Constitution?’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 565; E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: 
Challenges for World Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil  Society’ (2006) 19(3)  Leiden Journal of International 
Law 633-667; S. Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 749; M. Kumm, 
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multiple times in global constitutional literature, the concept of constitutionalism seems to suffer from an 
ever-increasing definitional inflation in the global context.    
The way in which constitutionalism is defined seems to depend on the particular object of the global 
constitutional exercise; whether to ‘map’5 or ‘shape’6 global governance or to criticize the idea of global 
constitutionalism itself.  ‘Mapping’ global governance in constitutional terms involves the recasting of 
discrete areas of international legal practice in constitutional terms, 7 or, more ambitiously, the United 
Nations Charter (UNC) as a ‘constitutional document’ for world order, 8 the positing of ius cogens norms 
positivized in provisions such as Article 53 of the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 as a 
constitutional ‘hierarchy of norms’,9  or the designation of the International Court of Justice as an 
‘international constitutional court’10 prospectively exercising judicial control over United Nations Security 
Council actions through judicial review.  ‘Shaping’ approaches tend to involve more explicitly value-based 
conceptions of constitutionalism to recommend certain reforms to global governance practices including 
the rolling out of judicial review, or the insertion of human rights standards in certain global govern ance 
regimes and practices.11   Critics, on the other hand, decry the use of constitutionalism in this way due to 
the lack of institutions or global constituent subject robust enough to support global constitutionalism, 
stipulating certain necessary and sufficient conditions (usually something resembling a demos or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
‘The Legitimacy of International Law:  A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15(5) EJIL 907- 931.  In a 
critical vein, see Krisch’s elaboration of a ‘foundational’ constitutionalism in N.  Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism:  The 
Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), Ch. 2. 
5 Wiener et al (n 2) 8. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See above (n 4). 
8 Particularly in the light of its supremacy under Article 103.  See E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ 
(2006) 55 ICLQ 51-76.  See also N. Detsomboonrut, International Law as a Constitutional Legal System, Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015.  
9 De Wet (n 8) 58-9. 
10 De Wet (n 8) 65. 
11 See, for example, A. Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism:  the Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 LJIL 579 -610; J. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty:  Rethinking 
Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012), Ch. 5. 
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constituent power) in support of their case.12   As a result, in global constitutional literature, ‘constitution’ 
or ‘constitutionalism’ is variously defined as a foundational blueprint for government,13 a hierarchy of 
norms,14 the protection of core fundamental values such as fundamental rights or the rule of law 15, the 
legal-systemic qualities of normative orders including power conferring and power limiting rules,16 the 
existence of a demos,17 the epistemological condition of modernity, 18 modern attitudes to power,19 neo-
liberal economics,20 judicial review21 and democratic deliberation.22   Conceptually speaking, then, the field 
of global constitutionalism is best characterised as a cacophony. 
The presence of the cacophony in global constitutional discourse seems to vindicate the main lines of 
attack of critics of suprastate constitutionalism more generally predicated on its ‘impossibility’, its 
‘inconceivability’, its ‘improbability’ and its ‘illegitimacy’.23  In summary, these forms of suprastate 
constitutional skepticism are critical of the idea of taking constitutionalism beyond the state on the grounds 
that the problems which constitutionalism was designed to address were, and are, peculiar to states, not 
least its ‘monopoly of legitimate coercive force’ (impossibility); that the state provides a unique ‘epistemic 
horizon’24 within which the concept of constitutionalism would or could make sense (inconceivability); that 
                                                                 
12 D. Grimm, ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization’ (2005) 12 Constellations 447-463, Krisch (n 4), M. 
Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds),  The Twilight of Constitutionalism? 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
13 See for example B. Fassbender, ’The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 
Col. J. Transnat’l Law, 529. 
14 De Wet (n 8). 
15 Gardbaum (n 4), see also Cohen (n 11). 
16 WJ Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review (CUP, Cambridge 2007), Ch. 2; Paulus, ’The International 
Legal System as a Constitution’ in JL Dunoff and JP Tractman (eds), Ruling the World?  Constitutionalism, International 
Law, and Global Governance (CUP, Cambridge, 2009).  For extended discussion see Detsomboonrut (n 8). 
17 Grimm (n 12).  See also D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 282. 
18 Krisch (n 12). 
19 Krisch (n 4). 
20 Loughlin (n 12).  See also  K.  Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic 
Constitutionalism?’ (2002) 8(4) Constellations 442-460. 
21 Cohen (n 11). 
22 Peters (n 11). 
23N. Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519-543, 520. 
24 Ibid, 521. 
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even accepting the transformations entailed in a ‘post-Westphalian’25 world, no site of suprastate 
governance could be legitimated to the same extent as the state  or credibly take its place as a political 
actor (improbability); and relatedly, any attempt to legitimize suprastate governance in constitutional 
terms is therefore necessarily illegitimate.26   The existence of the cacophony fuels these forms of 
suprastate constitutionalism in that the question of impossibility is refl ected in the fact that the myriad of 
conceptions of constitutionalism advanced in global constitutionalism testify to the fact that the unique 
problems of legitimacy in the state and in particular the centralization of power are not replicated beyond 
the state resulting in a radical fragmentation of the concept.  The cacophony is similarly symptomatic, it 
could be argued, of the question of inconceivability in that the application of the concept to a 
‘mysterious’27 epistemic horizon such as that of global governance, gives rise to chaotic ‘definitional 
conundrums’28  surrounding the concept at the global level as evidenced by the cacophony.  Furthermore, 
the cacophony seems to lend credence to the ‘improbability’ critique in that the slicing and dicing of the 
concept of constitutionalism evident in the global constitutional cacophony cannot hope to legitimate 
global governance in the ways in which its proponents seem to envisage such as to rival the pre -emptive 
authority of states.  Finally, the attempt to sanctify that which ought not to be sanctified with the mantle of 
constitutionalism at the root of the illegitimacy critique results in in ‘empty and misleading’29 partial or 
fragmented conceptions of constitutionalism evident in the constitutional cacophony. Viewed in this light, 
the global constitutional cacophony seems to testify to the emptiness of the concept of constitutionalism 
beyond the state and the rudderlessness of the field of global constitutionalism.  The fact that we can have 
so many different and at times contradictory accounts of constitutionalism serves to highlight the 
                                                                 
25 N. Walker, ‘Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids:  Mapping the global disorder of normative orders’ (2008) 6 
I*CON 373-396, 387. 
26 Walker (n 23), 522.  
27 D Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?  
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 
28 JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman, ’A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in J Dunoff and JL 
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?  Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance  (CUP, Cambridge, 
2009)  9. 
29 Walker (n 23) , 522. 
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redundancy of any concept of suprastate constitutionalism, not least in the context of global governance 
where it cannot hope to deliver on its promise to ‘map’30 and ‘shape’31 global governance in the light of its 
definitional fluidity. 
This article will attempt to address the global constitutional cacophony as well as suprastate 
constitutional skepticism by developing a particular conception of constitutionalism entitled 
‘constitutionalism as legitimacy’. In developing the conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy,  the 
relationship between the historically contingent idea of constitutionalism and broader theories of 
legitimacy are traced in order to identify precisely the specific type or form of legitimacy that the notion of 
constitutionalism best resembles.  Using the concept of legitimacy as a basis for a conception of 
constitutionalism, it is argued, provides a bridge between the state and non-state contexts in that it 
introduces a common denominator involving a mutual preoccupation with power and authority between 
these two contexts.   
Constitutionalism as legitimacy presents the historical practices of constitutionalism in states as a 
discursive form of legitimacy which entails both factual and normative components. The concept of 
constitutionalism as legitimacy is further developed as a form of reason-giving for the legitimacy of an 
authority, identifying the relevant reasons with which constitutionalism purports to  legitimate authority.  
These relate to a mix of liberalism and republicanism and are ordered according to the primary 
preoccupations of both theories; the problematization of the origins, the aims and the methods of 
authority.  The article goes on to illustrate how this framework of reasons in constitutionalism as legitimacy 
provides a ‘good’ account of the concept of constitutionalism in that it is historically relevant, sufficiently 
general to provide a workable conception in different institutional and political contexts as well as provides 
                                                                 
30 Wiener et al (n 2) 8. 
31 Ibid. 
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the important ‘guidance function’ of constitutionalism  as a form of practical reason,32 not least in the 
context of global governance.  
The article proceeds as follows.  Part 2 shows how a concern for legitimacy provides the key motivating 
factor behind global constitutional debates allowing it to serve as a common basis between state and non -
state conceptions of constitutionalism. Part 3 provides a brief overview of the idea of legitimacy and 
identifies constitutionalism as a ‘mixed’ form of legitimacy entailing both normative and descriptive 
components based on its status as a law-centric form of historical social practice.  Part 4 develops the 
conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy as a framework of reasons for the legitimacy of authority 
based on the dimensions of power or authority problematized by the ‘co-original’33 theories of 
republicanism and liberalism; namely its origins, its aims and its methods.  Part 5 shows how this 
conception of constitutionalism can be ‘translated’ to the global level without shedding its relevance or 
analytical or critical functions which is illustrated by reference to the legitimacy questions surrounding the 
United Nations Security Council’s ‘war on terror’ and Part 6 shows how constitutionalism as legitimacy 
clearly addresses skepticism about the exportation of the concept of constitutionalism to the global 
context.  
II. The Legitimacy of Global Constitutionalism 
Any attempt to cut through the global constitutional cacophony to assess whether the cumulative 
skepticisms surrounding suprastate constitutionalism are warranted requires a substantive inquiry into the 
purposes of taking constitutionalism beyond the state, and its application to the global context  in 
particular.   To paraphrase a leading commentator on the debate, in the global context we need to identify 
                                                                 
32 See N. Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds) 
European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) Passim. 
33  J. Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy:  A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’ (2001) 29 Political 
Theory 766, 767. 
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the question to which constitutionalism is supplied as the answer.34  The question, what is (global) 
constitutionalism for, conventionally elicits two responses reflecting two ‘anxieties of the international 
jurist’; the fragmentation of international law and the rise of global governance. 35  Whereas they are 
usually treated as separate questions, they can, it is argued, be collapsed into one overarching concern 
which motivates global constitutionalism more generally; a broader concern with the legitimacy of  the 
activities of de facto suprastate authorities in an emerging ‘New World Order’.36   
The legitimacy concerns related to the second anxiety of the international jurist - that is the emergence 
of global governance - do so in a rather obvious way and the use of constitutionalism to temper the 
legitimacy problems which accompany global governance are clear, for example, in ‘compensatory’ 
accounts of global constitutionalism.37  The core justification of the compensatory function of this form of 
global constitutionalism lies in the fact that ‘political decisions affect people in other states, people who 
have not elected the decision-makers and can in no way control them’38 as well as the lack of a democratic 
mandate or control of non-state decision-makers.  These developments are occasioning a shift in the 
‘justificatory basis of international law’39, from state consent to more normative standards which 
determine the legitimacy of international acts.  
 However, even the question of the fragmentation of international law can also, in the final analysis, be 
reduced to a preoccupation with legitimacy in global order.   Anxieties about the fragmentation of 
international law taps into a broader ‘anxiety of the international jurist’ surrounding the perennial question 
                                                                 
34 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited“, (1997) 1 Max 
Planck UNYB 1-33. 
35 J Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 
(OUP, Oxford, 2009), 18. Dunoff and Trachtman (n 28) 5-9. 
36 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order  (Princeton University Press 2004).  Whereas use of this phrase here is inspired 
by Slaughter’s title, unlike Slaughter’s account of disaggregated states and governmental networks, it is used as a 
generic label for the contemporary condition of law and politics incorporating globalized states, state-like global 
regimes, the fortification of the international legal system more generally and the interactions between different legal 
orders.   
37 Peters (n 11) . 
38 Ibid. 592. 
39 Peters (n 11) 587. 
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of the nature of international norms qua law and legal system properly so called.40  This hoary old issue 
questions the credentials of the international legal order as a developed legal system (at least as compared 
with state legal systems) due to the lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism, the dubious 
‘systematicity’ of norms providing the requisite unity of a global legal order, as well as the os tensibly poor 
record in obedience to the norms of international law by their primary addressees, states. 41   
The putative fragmentation of international law feeds into and exacerbates this anxiety due to the fact 
that the fragmentation of the international legal order into a global ‘disorder of normative orders’42 seems 
to demonstrate the inability of international law qua unitary legal order to govern the globe in a 
comprehensive way,43 thereby encouraging skepticism as to the existence of a robust overarching 
international legal system.  For this form of international legal skepticism, then, international law is best 
conceived of as a ‘set’44 of rules rather than a system of law. However, concerns about the status of 
international law as a unitary legal system posed by the fragmentation of international law are not, or at 
least not only, concerns about international law for its own sake.  Rather, the undermining of the idea of a 
unitary system of international law potentially threatens the increasingly central role attributed to law in 
the legitimacy of international relations.  One of the hallmarks of the transition from the ‘Westphalian’ to 
the ‘post-Westphalian’ era is a shift away from legitimacy based on the balance of power, hegemony 45 or 
                                                                 
40 As asserted most famously by HLA Hart:  ‘In form, international law resembles [..] a [primitive ] regime of primary 
rules, even though the content of its often elaborate rules are very unlike those of a primitive society, and many of its 
concepts, methods, and techniques are the same as those of modern municipal law.’ HLA Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Clarendon, Oxford, 1994), 227. The debate has moved on considerably in recent years.  See J. Waldron, ‘International 
Law;  “A Relatively Small and Unimportant” Part of Jurisprudence?’ In L Duarte d’Almeida, J Edwards, A Dolcetti (eds), 
Reading HLA Hart’s ‘The Concept of Law’ (Hart, Oxford, 2013), S. Besson ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ 
in S. Besson and J Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP, Oxford, OUP 2010), R. Dworkin, ’A New 
Philosophy for International Law’ (2013) 41(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 2-30, Paulus (n 16). 
41 See e.g. JL Goldsmith and EA Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP, Oxford, 2005).  For a contrary view see 
TM Franck, “The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power:  International Law in an Age of Power 
Disequilibrium’ (2006) 100 AJIL 88. 
42 Walker (n 25). 
43 Reflecting a core tenet of analytical positivistm that law, probably so called, is comprehensive in its reach.  See for 
example, J. Raz, The Authority of Law, (OUP, 2009 ) 43. 
44 K. Culver and M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders:  An Essay in General Jurisprudence (OUP 2010), 22.  
45 See, for example, JS Nye, The Paradox of American Power:  Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone  
(OUP, Oxford, 2002), 17. 
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state-consent46, to institutional rule-based forms of legitimacy.47 Central to this rule-based account of the 
legitimacy of international relations is the presumption of a unitary system of public international law 
imbued with law-related values such as legality and the rule of law and crucially, something resembling 
‘secondary rules’;48 the lynchpin of mainstream positivist accounts of a legal system.   If the norms of 
international law do not form part of a coherent unitary legal system, then the enforcement of discrete sets 
of ‘primary rules’49 of international law, such as those relating to the legitimate use of military force, run 
the risk of quite literally succumbing to the rule of the powerful. Where primary rule -enforcement is 
unconstrained by one of the key components of legal systems in states; namely secondary rules of change, 
recognition and particularly adjudication,50 it begins to look more like a primitive legal system; a coercion-
based account of law predicated on powerful sovereigns.51   As such, any challenge to the authority of 
international norms qua binding system of law can undermine the rule-based view of international order 
and contemporary accounts of legitimacy in international relations more generally.52     
Which Legitimacy? 
Identifying legitimacy as a common foundation of global constitutional debates therefore provides a 
fruitful starting point from which to make sense of the global constitutional cacophony.  As noted in the 
previous section, the concept of legitimacy is undergoing something of renaissance in international legal 
circles in recent times.53  However, this ‘turn to legitimacy’ in the ostensible ‘post-ontological’54 phase of 
                                                                 
46 See N. Krisch, ‘The Decay of Consent:  International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods’ (2004) 108(1) AJIL 1-40.  
47 For a classic account see T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP, New York, 1990).  For a more 
recent account see J Brunnee and SJ Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2010).  See 
also  J Goldstein, M Kahler,  RO Keohane, A-M Slaughter, ’Special Issue:  Legalization and World Politics’ (2000) 54(3) 
International Organization 401-19. For a ‘mapping’ of the different trends in theorising global order see Walker (n 25). 
48 Hart (n 40), 97. 
49 Hart (n 40), 94. 
50 Hart (n 40), 97. 
51 Such as Austin’s sovereignty-inspired account of law as the orders of a sovereign backed by threats for non-
compliance. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, WE Rumble (ed), (CUP, Cambridge 1995) 
52 Franck (n 47), Goldstein et al (n 47).  
53 For an excellent overview of the state of the debate, see C Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in 
International Law’ (2014) 34  OJLS 729-758. 
54 Franck (n 47) 
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theorizing international law is not without its critics and has been met with an equally skeptical dismissal of 
legitimacy in international law; introduced merely to ‘ensure a warm feeling in the audience.’55  Indeed, as 
a contested term in itself, best by ‘fuzziness and indeterminacy’56 and arguably more contested than 
constitutionalism and subject to even more cacophonous debate than constitutionalism itself, it may seem 
an inauspicious place to attempt to grapple with the cacophony of global constitutional ism.  However, 
identifying a common thread of legitimacy in the cacophonous debates on constitutionalism beyond the 
state more generally at least provides us with a common root of the various conceptions which can bring 
harmony to the cacophony as well as establish some common ground between the state and suprastate 
contexts. 
Legitimacy is conventionally defined as the obedience of subjects to an authority bracketing coercion or 
self-interest.57  That is that the reasons for the obedience of subjects to an authority relate to the 
legitimacy of that authority rather than the fact that it uses coercion to obtain obedience or that it serves 
the self-interest of each individual subject.  Beyond this minimalist baseline understanding of legitimacy, 
theories of legitimacy fragment into a myriad of different positions and questions regarding what, precisely, 
this might entail.  As such here are a variety of ways to cut the ‘conceptual cake’ of legitimacy in theoretical 
terms and the literature on legitimacy is littered with various taxonomies including sociological legitimacy,  
moral legitimacy, legal legitimacy, normative legitimacy, legitimacy as a ‘belief’, legitimacy as justice, 
legitimacy as consent and legitimacy as beneficial consequences among a variety of others.58  
Notwithstanding the fragmentation and diversity in theorizing legitimacy, the diverse threads can be 
                                                                 
55 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom:  Kantian Themes in Today’s International Law’ (2007) 4 No 
Foundations:  Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism, 7-28, 16. 
56 J. Crawford, ‘The Prolems of Legitimacy-Speak’ (2004) 98 ASIL Proceedings 271, 271. 
57   See I. Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’ (1999) 53 International Organization 379-408.  In 
the context of international law Franck argues that it is precisely the absence of coercion from the international 
sphere, at least in the form of a global sovereign enforcing international norms, which makes legitimacy such a fruitful 
subject of inquiry for international realtions. Franck (n 47) 19.  Of course this is not to suggest that legitimacy cannot 
operate concurently with others reasons for obedience such as coercion and self-interest.  See for example. L Green, 
The Authority of the State (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), 75. 
58 For a comprehensive overview see Peter, Fabienne, "Political Legitimacy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta  (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/legitimacy/>.. 
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organized and briefly summarized according to three main trends in theorizing legitimacy; sociological 
legitimacy, normative legitimacy and ‘mixed’ accounts.59 
Promoted most famously by Max Weber, sociological legitimacy primarily relates to the 
belief in the opinion of the ruled as to the legitimacy of the ruler as evidenced by obedience to the 
commands of the ruler.60  In such a case legitimacy relates to the ‘belief by an actor that a rule or institution 
ought to be obeyed.’61  It has been subjected to a variety of interpretations and some criticism, primarily 
for its subjective and almost solipsistic nature.62  For example, it has been argued that in sociological 
accounts, the concept of legitimacy does little or no work; legitimacy is merely what happens63 or worse, 
rulers whose commands are wicked are nonetheless considered legitimate.64  Beetham has attempted to 
rescue Weber’s account from this critique arguing that legitimacy on this view doesn’t simply mean that 
legitimacy is merely what happens, that power is automatically self-justifying.  Rather he argues that a 
power relationship is not legitimate because subjects merely believe in the legitimacy of an authority but 
rather that the legitimacy of an authority can be ‘be justified in terms of [the] beliefs’ of the subjects of the 
authority.65  Thus, when assessing the legitimacy of a particular power relationship we should examine the 
                                                                 
59 Some also add ‘legal legitimacy’ as a distinct form of legitimacy.  See Thomas (n 53); R. Fallon, ‘Legitimacy and the 
Constitution’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1789.   However, it is submitted that ‘legal legitimacy’ can be collapsed 
into sociological legitimacy rather than forming a distinct category on its own.  Fallon, for example, while arguing for 
legal legitimacy as a distinct form of legitimacy argues tha t it inovles the idea that the legitimacy of a directive of an 
authroity is legitimacy if it conforms with the law (which includes the constitution). (1794).  However this, in turn, begs 
the question of the legitimacy of the law/constitution which seems to boil down to a form of sociological legitimacy:  
‘[The Constitution’s] sociological legitimacy gave it legal legitimacy’  (1804-5)  and ‘The process by which the 
Constitution achieved legal legitimacy contains a large lesson about the dependence of legal legitimacy on sociological 
legitimacy.  With repsect to the most fundamental matters, sociological legitimacy is not only a necessary condtion of 
legal legitimacy, but also a sufficient one.’ (1805).    As such, for taxonomic purposes it is submitted that legal 
legitimacy constitutes a subcategory of sociological legitimacy rather than a distinct form of legitimacy. 
60 M. Weber, Economy and Society, 2 Vols  (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1978), 213 
61 I. Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2008) 7. See also Hurd (57). 
62 D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power 2nd ed. (Palgrave, 2013), Ch. 1. 
63 As Griffiths argued with respect to the British constitution: ‘The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, 
changing from day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens.  Everything that happens is 
constitutional.  And if nothing happened that would be constitutional too.’  J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ 
(1979) 42 MLR 1-21, 19. 
64 Beetham, (n 62), 10-11.  See  also J. Will iams ‘Nothing Succeeds Like Success?  Legitimacy and International 
Relations’ in B. Holden (ed.) The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change (MacMillan 1996). 
65 Beetham (n 62), 11. 
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extent to which the authority conforms to the values, standards and normative expectations of its subjects 
rather than merely reporting on the subjects’ ‘belief’ in the legitimacy of an authority.66 
 If sociological legitimacy focuses on the ‘internal point of view’ of the opinions and beliefs of 
the subjects of an authority, normative accounts of legitimacy relate to an ‘external’ or at least 
universalisable point of view, focusing on the form of objective or shared standards of (moral) conduct, 
creating or sustaining a ‘right to rule’ against which the an authority and its commands and actions can be 
evaluated.67  It is under this rubric that vast swathes of normative political theory can be recast as theories 
of legitimacy.  As Mulligan notes, even if many of the classical political theorists did not necessarily mention 
the word “legitimacy”, the substance of their theories were essentially concerned with what we now call 
the normative or moral dimension of the legitimacy of authority.68  The area of normative 
legitimacy/political theory is, of course, vast and diverse dealing with a variety of questions and values 
including the relationship between legitimacy and equality, liberty, consent, justice, security, democracy 
among as well as the complex issues of the relationship between the individual and a political community.69  
 A third ‘mixed’ account of legitimacy views legitimacy as a phenomenon which entails both 
sociological or ‘factual’ as well as political theoretical, or ‘normative’ dimensions.   It has its origins in the 
Weberian account of legitimacy,70 however perhaps the best known exponent of this particular form of 
legitimacy is the work of Jürgen Habermas, who has developed a complex account of legitimacy over the 
past number of decades.71  Dismissing purely normative accounts of legitimacy as too abstract, and purely 
sociological accounts as mere ‘historical understanding’72, Habermas probes an alternative between the 
                                                                 
66 Beetham (n 62) 11. 
67 Peter (n 58) 
68 S. Mulligan, ‘The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations’ (2006) 34 Millennium 349, 359.   
69 See Peter (n 58).  
70 In fact many reinterpretations of the Weberian account of sociological legitimacy such as Beetham’s outlined above 
come very close to ‘mixed’ accounts of legitimacy. Beetham (n 62). See also Thomas (n 53), 744.  
71J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, T. McCarthy trans, 2 Vols (Boston, Beacon Press, 1984); J. 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, T. Rehg trans. (Polity, 1996) (hereinafter BFN) 
72 J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, T. McCarthy trans. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1979) 205. 
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two based on ‘facticity and validity’ or ‘facts and norms’.73   This mixed account of legitimacy involves a 
consensus around particular facts about how the world is; that is the forms of power and authority and the 
institutions and structures which support it, for example, in the particular political and constitutional 
arrangements of a state as well as the need to make decisions based on normative criteria.  That is that the 
decisions or directives of authorities in certain factual circumstances must be justifiable to the subjects of 
that authority.  A key element of legitimacy for Habermas is the idea of ‘communicative power’ 74 in which 
reasons have a ‘motivational force’75 for the subjects of an authority to obey its directives.  Key to this 
process of legitimacy based on communicative power is a discourse principle where ‘only those norms are 
valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational di scourses’.76  Summarizing and  
simplifying considerably what is a complex and sprawling theory, then, for Habermas legitimacy involves 
the process of communicative action surrounding the directives of an authority in a public discourse 
between authorities and subjects where reasons for the legitimacy of the authority based on citizens 
interests, values and identities are mobilized creating a motivation for obedience on behalf of citizens 
themselves.77    
Constitutionalism as Legitimacy 
If constitutionalism is a proxy for legitimacy in global constitutional discourse (and indeed in much 
political theoretical discourse more generally), then the question of which type of legitimacy of the three 
broad categories outlined above constitutionalism best approximates is important to understand the ways 
in which constitutionalism can and cannot address the legitimacy of authroity.  This in turn implicates some 
sort of definition of constitutionalism as the classification of constitutionalism as a p articular type of 
legitimacy, whether sociological, normative or mixed, will necessarily entail a stipulative understanding of 
                                                                 
73 Which was the title of his book in English.  Habermas ‘BFN’ (n 71).  For an alternative, albeit Habermas -inspired, 
account of legitimacy as involving both factual and normative elements see C. Thornhill, ‘Political Legitimacy:  A 
Theoretical Approach Between Facts and Norms’ (2011) 18(2) Constellations 135. 
74 Habermas, ‘BFN’ (n 71), 151. 
75 Habermas, ‘BFN’ (n 71), 151. 
76 Habermas, ‘BFN’ (n 71), xxxvi  
77 Habermas, ‘BFN’ (n 71) xxvii i . 
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the concept of constitutionalism itself.  Here the two questions will be dealt with in tandem.  Firstly the 
criteria for any good account of constitutionalism will be elaborated before moving on to specify which 
type of legitimacy, under these constraints, best conforms to the concept of constitutionalism as it appears 
in constitutional and political debates. 
In thinking about constitutionalism as a ‘standard’78 or ‘touchstone’79 of ‘code’80 of legitimacy, we are 
already constrained by its history and usage in the state context which narrows down somewhat the broad 
scope and contestation of the concept of legitimacy outlined briefly in the previous section. Firstly, 
constitutionalism is a way of thinking about legitimate government which is historically embedded in a 
particular era of human social and political development, primarily the development of the state from the 
sixteenth century onwards.81  Whereas the concept of constitutionalism entails ideas and values which 
predate its incarnation,82 the ideas which make up the contemporary conceptions of constitutionalism, 
including the idea of constitutionalism itself, are deeply rooted in modernity.  In particular, the values, 
practices and rhetoric of the political upheavals and reforms in Europe and North America from the late 
seventeenth century to mid-way through the nineteenth mark the era when the basic elements of 
constitutionalism were firmly established.83  These developments, of course, occurred and were particularly 
influenced by enlightenment thinking which inspired many constitutional reforms during this period. 84  
Perhaps the single most important animating enlightenment ideal which shaped the development of 
constitutionalism as a ‘political technology’, and which makes it stand out as a truly modern idea, was the 
placing of individuals at the centre of the political universe.  This was made clear in Hegel’s reflections on 
the French Revolution: that never before ‘had it been perceived that man’s existence centres in his head, 
                                                                 
78 G. J. Schochet ‘Introduction:  Constitutionalism, Liberalism and the Study of Politics’ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman 
(eds) Constitutionalism: NOMOS XX (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 2. 
79 Bodansky (n 4), 583. 
80 Walker ‘Translation’ (n 32), 38. 
81 See generally K. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980), M. 
Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, (Clarendon, Oxford, 1975), Ch. 3. 
82 See C. H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism:  Ancient and Modern, (Cornell University Press, Cornell, 1975). 
83 M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), Ch. 10. 
84 Loughlin (n 83). 
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i.e. in thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality.’ 85  This meant that government and 
political power, as Alexander Hamilton recognized wou ld no longer result form ‘accident and force  [but] 
reflection and choice.’86   
The fact that constitutionalism emerged as a relatively historically fixed (and geographically 
limited)87 way of thinking means that any attempt to analyse or understand it as a concept, or indeed 
marshal it to new contexts beyond the state must pay due regard to its nature as historical way of thinking 
about government, power and legitimacy.88  Otherwise, there is little use in adopting the specific term 
‘constitutionalism’ in the context of global law and governance when one among the variety of other, more 
specific, concepts and values employed in the history of human thought, such as justi ce or democracy, is in 
question and would be preferable to address the legitimacy problems which global governance is currently 
experiencing. 
 Even if the concept of constitutionalism developed in a relatively limited temporal and 
geographical period, it did develop out a diverse and at times contradictory series of practices, historical 
accidents and diverse political movements from the early modern ‘Whig’ revolution in England, to the more 
prominent republican revolutions in France and the U.S. to the ‘springtime of the nations’ in the mid -
eighteenth century to the more contemporary spread of constitutionalism in the aftermath of the cold 
                                                                 
85 G. W. F. Hegel The Philosophy of History (J Sibere, trans), Bufallo, NY: Promethues Books, 1991, 447 (Part IV, Section 
III, ch III) cited in Krisch (n 4), 49. 
86 The full  citation reads as follows:  ‘it has been reserved to the people of this country … to decide an important 
question, wehther the socieites of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from refl ection and 
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.’  J. 
Madison, A. Hamilton, J. Jay, The Federalist Papers [1788] Issac Kramnick (ed) (London:  Penguin, 1987), No 1 (87). 
87 See Dyson (n 81), Oakeshott (n 81). 
88 With the obvious caveat that constitutionalism is a largely euro-centric or Western phenomenon.  It is recognized 
that the Western-centric model of constitutionalism and the international legal order more generally can elide many 
non-Western forms of legitimacy and authority which do not conform to this model  such as the concept of Ubuntu in 
Zulu which is loosely translated into English as ‘humaneness’.  See S v. Makwanyane & Another 1995 (6), BCLR, 665 
(CC) para. 308 per Justice Mokgoro.  For discussion see O. Onazi, Human Rights from Community:  A Rights-Based 
Approach to Development (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 40-44.  It is beyond the scope of this article 
to deal with this problem in detail, however, I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my 
attention. 
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war.89  Reviewing the various practices and values conventionally associated with the concept of 
constitutionalism (and clearly on display in the global constitutional debates) reveals a lack of overarching 
coherence or conceptual purity in the development of the concept.  Constitutionalism thus emerged as, 
and compatible with, legislative and judicial supremacy, constitutional monarchies, revolutionary republics, 
various degrees of ‘writteness’,90 with and without canonical statements of fundamental rights, varying 
uses and degrees of law from clear examples of positive law, through to judicial precedents, customs, 
habits and conventions.   Thus, rather than being conceived of as a specific concrete and discrete set of 
practices and values or coherent set of necessary and sufficient conditions,  even within this relatively 
limited geographical and temporal space, constitutionalism is arguably better understand as, Grey argues, 
as  a series of ‘family resemblances’91 between diverse enlightenment infused practices of legitimacy and 
good government.  The significance of this feature of the development of constitutionalism is that any 
attempt at conceptual formulation must abstract, potentially considerably, from the various discrete 
instances of constitutionalism practiced in particular states in order to fashion a credible and workable 
definition of the concept.   
 Finally, part of the shift occasioned by enlightenment thinking was the increasing centrality 
of positive law as both an instrument of, and constraint upon, government. 92   Constitutionalism is 
therefore necessarily a law-centric phenomenon even if the precise extent to which law is implicated in 
government, and the precise definition of what, exactly, qualifies as ‘law’ in this context may be debated.  
What is clear is that many of the traits of analytical positive accounts of law including a system of norms, 
reasonably clearly identifiable sources of norms, the idea of hierarchical ordering and considerations of 
validity, have at least a significant, if not fundamental, role in the development of constitutional forms of 
                                                                 
89 Loughlin ‘Twilight’ (n 12). 
90 J. Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions:  Some Preliminaries’ in L. Alexander (ed), 
Constitutionalism:  Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), 153. 
91 T. C. Grey, ‘Constitutionalism:  An Analytical Framework’ in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, Constitutionalism:  
Nomos XX (New York, 1979), 191.  
92 See. G. Jell inek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Bad Hamburg v.d. Höhe : Gehlen ;1966); Dyson (n 81) Ch. 8. 
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government.93 The implication of law in the concept of constitutionalism introduces an element of 
‘facticity’ to the concept of constitutionalism; that is something that is practiced and empirically verifiable, 
rather than a purely ideal concept.94   Legal positivism has implicated the idea of ‘real world’  sociological 
practice to the idea of law, particularly in Hart’s well-known ‘social fact’ account95, but even Kelsen, who 
was less sanguine about the contribution sociology could make to the concept of law, did insist on the idea 
of ‘effectiveness’ as an essential element of the concept of law.96  Constitutionalism, therefore, like the 
concept of positive law itself, tracks the complex dynamic between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in political and 
legal practices.   Moreover, a further element of the implication of law in the concept of constitutionalism is 
the fact that it should track positive law’s ‘guiding’ function.97  That is that like law, constitutionalism should 
provide prescriptions for action in particular context.  In this way, constitutionalism, like the concept of law, 
can be conceived of as a form of practical reasoning.98 
 In the light of these constraints when considering the concept of legitimacy from the 
viewpoint of constitutionalism, as a form of legitimacy, then, constitutionalism most corresponds, it is 
argued to the third category of legitimacy outlined in the previous section; that is that constitutionalism is a 
form of ‘mixed’ legitimacy which entails both factual and normative aspects.   Whereas constitutionalism 
does have a sociological dimension stemming primarily from its law-centric nature, it also necessarily 
involves a strong normative dimension which provides a series of general reasons for the legitimacy of a 
particular authority based on, for example, its respect for certain substantive values such as fundamental 
rights.    
                                                                 
93 This is exemplified in the work of Hans Kelsen, and in particular account of the unity of law and state.  H. Kelsen, 
General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1945).  
94 See Habermas ‘BFN’ (n 71), xi. 
95 Where he claimed that his concept of law was an exercise in ‘descriptive sociology’.  Hart (n 40), vi. 
96 At least with respect to the basic norm.  Kelsen (n 93) 119. 
97 J. Raz, The Authority of Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009). 
98 Walker, (n 32). 
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Expressions of this ‘mixed’ form of legitimacy in constitutional thought are manifest in the 
work of a variety of contemporary constitutional scholars including Dworkin,99 Alexy,100 Raz,101 Loughlin,102 
Fallon103 and somewhat obviously Habermas, who in his later work has brought his ideas of legitimacy and 
communicative power to bear specifically on the questions of constitutional government. 104 
The factual dimension of constitutionalism as a form of legitimacy, then, implies that the 
appropriate context for the application of constitutionalism, the context within which constitutionalism is 
‘apt’, is the existence, in fact, of a pattern of rule-based obedience to an authority, an empirically verifiable 
‘habit of obedience.’105   From the viewpoint of the broader questions of political legitimacy, this dimension 
of constitutionalism therefore relates to the justification of actually existing authority, as opposed to the 
foundation of authority hypothetical or otherwise.106  In its factual register, then, constitutionalism is made 
up of local ‘traditions’ of legitimate government entailing a ‘composite of (frequently inconsistent) beliefs, 
opinions, values, decision, myths, rituals, deposited over generations’107 about what legitimate government 
requires.  As such its precise contents will vary between different contexts. 
However, these various factual elements of constitutionalism as a form of legitimacy, as noted, betray 
‘family resemblances’ which allow for the formularization of a more general conception of 
constitutionalism.  Thus, even if the experience of these individual states is ‘varied’108, there is, as Loughlin 
argues, a ‘coherent trajectory’109 of western constitutional development.  As such, the ‘coherent trajectory’ 
                                                                 
99 Through the ideas of ‘fit’ and ‘justification’ in legal interpretation.  See R. Dworkin , Taking Rights Seriously (London, 
Duckworth, 1977) Ch. 4. 
100 In his characterization of principles as optimization requirements relative to what is ‘legally and factually possible’. 
R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, J. Rivers trans. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002),  67. 
101 Noting the ‘Janus-l ike aspect of [constitutional] interpretation’ (177) between factual ‘fidelity’ and normative 
‘innovation’ (180-3).  Raz above (n 90). 
102 Drawing the distinction between the ‘symbolic’ and ‘instrumental’ functions of constitutions .  Loughlin (n 12), 52. 
103 Who argues that constitutionalism involves social, normative and legal legitimacy.  Fallon (n 59)  
104 Particularly in Between Facts and Norms. Habermas ‘BFN’ (n 71).  See also Habermas (n 33). 
105 Austin (n 51), Lecture VI. 
106 Cf. Peters (n 58). 
107 M Krygier, ‘Law as Tradition’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237 , 241. 
108 Loughlin, (n 83) 158. 
109 ibid.  Emphasis Added. 
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in these practices speak to constitutionalism’s universalizi ng normative register.  In this way, 
constitutionalism can be seen as a particular, historical way of thinking about the legitimacy of political 
power in the practices of primarily European and North-American states since the seventeenth century, 
culminating in what can be described as a ‘Western Constitutional Tradition’. 110 
The fact that constitutionalism emerges from a series of convergent practices betraying 
‘family resemblances’ rather an one single and uniform practice means that the normative dimension of 
constitutionalism cannot be the product of a ‘time free’111 universal and uniform single value detached 
from the particular contexts within which they developed.  The normative dimension of constitutionalism 
cannot provide a static blueprint or paradigm for legitimate government such as a precise series of criteria 
based on a priori principles of justice or equality or autonomy from which a series of necessary and 
sufficient conditions could be distilled. Unlike other ideal accounts of legitimacy based on for example, 
consent or justice,112 the normative dimension of the tradition does not conform to any one particular 
value system or ‘pure’ political theory.  Recalling Oakeshott’s quip that the reality of politi cs ‘offend most of 
our rational and all of our artistic sensibilities’113, the normative core that emerges from the ‘family 
resemblances’ making up the ‘Western Constitutional Tradition’ are a mix or blend of idealized political 
theories.  The political theories which dominate the normative dimension of the ‘western constitutional 
tradition’ such as it is, are centrally preoccupied with what Benjamin Constant described as the liberty of 
the ancients and the liberty of the moderns; that is a mix of  ideal types of republican and liberal theory.  114    
                                                                 
110 Loughlin, (n 83) 158. 
111Krygier (n 107), 248. 
112 Characteristic features of the liberal tradition.  See J. Locke, Two Treaties of Government, P. Laslett (ed.), (CUP 
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(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010).  Although he does not refer to l iberalism and republicanism specifically in his 
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Republicanism departs from the premise that society is the most basic and primary political 
unit, within which individuals gain and develop their agency.115 Republican theory is explicitly concerned 
with the terms of engagement, and frequent tensions between the individual and the collective, primarily 
mediated by the idea of self-legislation; where the individual and the collective interact through the 
involvement of the individual in collective decision-making.116  Contemporary republican theory has 
developed this idea to promote a particular conception of freedom as non-domination whereby an 
individual is free to the extent that no other person or group ‘has the capacity to interfere in their affairs on 
an arbitrary basis’.117  In terms of legitimate government, then, in order to avoid arbitrary interference, 
public power must be traceable to citizens. To actively engage and participate in political decisions in the 
pursuit of the goals of self-legislation is to reduce the risk of being dominated by others, of having one’s life 
chances interfered with by others on an arbitrary basis.  Thus in institutional terms, the accent in republican 
theory is on deliberation, contestation and participation which makes it the natural foundation theory for 
political forms of constitutionalism.118 
Unlike republicans, liberals postulate the individual as the most basic political unit and construct a 
political philosophy around this idea.  The basic aim of politics, for liberals, is to secure the liberty of 
individuals by preventing unwarranted interference from political power. 119  Where it is necessary for 
political power to restrict individual liberty, such as to prevent harm to others, 120 this should only be done 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
account of the development of the modern state, Oakeshott provides a similar picture of the development of politics 
in modernity, identifying the development of the modern state as a tension between two conc eptions of association 
drawn from Roman law; ‘societas’ and ‘universitas’ which tracks this dichotomy. The former relates to formal bonds of 
legality whereas the latter relates to an association bound together by a common purpose. See Oakeshott (n 81) 185-
326. For discussion see M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, Oxford, 2003), Ch. 2. 
115 For a classic account see J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings V. Gourevitch (ed), 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1997).   For a more recent statement, see P. Petit,  Republicanism:  A Theory of Freedom and 
Government (OUP 1999).  What are presented here are stylized accounts of republicanism and liberalism for the sake 
of clarity.  There can be conceptually, and is in practice, many overlaps between liberalism and republicanism which 
are bracketed here for the sake of argument.  Some of these overlaps are explored in the ensuing section. 
116 Habermas ‘BFN’ (n 71). 
117 Petit, (n 115 165. 
118 See R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (CUP, 2007). 
119 Locke, (n 112), Chapter II. 
120 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985). 
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within procedural constraints dictated by values such as due process and the rule of law.121  As such, law 
and legal institutions feature predominantly in liberal constitutional theory.  Indeed, pe rhaps the most 
defining feature of liberalism, and its most marked contrast with contemporary republicanism, is its belief 
in the ability to legally isolate certain values as fundamental to individual flourishing by reference either to 
metaphysical ideas of natural rights,122 or through some sort of constructed agreement on basic values 
through an ‘overlapping consensus’.123  Given that these values are most basic or fundamental, then, they 
can and should be shielded from quotidian political processes though legal means such as their codification 
in a bill of rights or some other form of ‘higher law’ beyond the reach of daily politics.  This position 
usually124 leads liberals to favour judicial review to secure these values.   
III. Developing ‘Constitutionalism as Legitimacy’ 
As a ‘mixed’ form of legitimacy, then, constitutionalism relates to ‘good arguments’125 for the 
legitimacy of a particular authority as part of a broader discursive process. Weber emphasized the 
discursive reason-giving nature of legal-rational legitimacy arguing that giving of reasons created a 
motivation for obedience given the fact that a decision was based on reason rather than personal will. 126 
This discursive aspect of legitimacy evident in Weberian accounts of legal-rationality was developed at 
length by Habermas in his idea of communicative action where, as noted, reasoning-giving plays a central 
role.127   The exercise of coercion by the state is thus legitimated through the mobilization of ‘reasons and 
arguments’128 which generates the ‘communicative power’129  central to his account of legitimacy. This 
                                                                 
121 This l iberal sentiment is clearly i llustrated in the ‘prescribed by law’ requirements of the ‘restricted freedoms’ 
provisions of Articles 8-11 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  
122 Locke (n 112). 
123 Rawls (n 114), Lecture IV. 
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127 See references at (n 71).  
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relationship between decisions of authority and their justification through reason-giving was also 
acknowledged by Carl Friedrich, the Germano-American constitutional theorist who made a connection 
between authority created by reason-giving -  which supplements and act of will ‘by adding reasons to it’130  
- and Theodor Mommesen’s analysis of the  etymology of the word ‘authority’; which stems from the 
Roman root of the word augere, ‘to augment’.131 
 However the reasons provided by an authority for its legitimacy are subject to reasonable 
disagreement and can therefore be challenged and contested. This is due to the fact that in a 
‘disenchanted’132 world,  where the idea of divine or metaphysical truths are no longe r accepted as 
authoritative reasons, ‘secular’ accounts of legitimacy will naturally attract reasonable disagreement.133  As 
such, there is no privileged epistemic vantage point in contemporary politics which would allow for the 
shielding of particular legitimating reasons from disagreement and contestation.134  Moreover, the ‘co-
original’ values of republicanism and liberalism which make up constitutionalism as legitimacy are, 
themselves, in tension with each other as the perfection of the values of one can only be achieved at the 
cost of the values of the other.  As such, reasons for the legitimacy of an authority based on, for example, 
republican theory can be contested with countervailing reasons drawing on liberal political theory.  The 
reasons accompanying the directives of an authority such as a legislative, administrative or judicial decision, 
because of their imminent contestability make such directives in Habermas’s terminology a  ‘caesura’135 in 
ongoing discussion rather than a ‘conversation stopper’ on the question of the legitimacy of the decision or 
the authority itself.  Such directives, therefore, are provisionally, rather than categorically justified, allowing 
for ongoing contestation and deliberation of the balance between the ‘co-original’ values of liberty and 
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equality.  This tension and contestation in these mixed forms of legitimacy introduce a dynamic and 
reflexive element making legitimacy an on-going activity rather than an ‘end-state’. 136 
 Constitutionalism as legitimacy can contribute to these discursive reason-giving accounts of 
legitimacy by organizing the different reasons conventionally advanced to legitimate or contest the 
legitimacy of an authority.  The various tropes commonly associated with constitutionalism such as liberty, 
equality, democracy, the rule of law, separation of powers or fundamental rights can be traced back to the 
core constitutional theories of liberalism and republicanism.  However, constitutionalism as legitimacy 
orders these values and aspirations by isolating the different types of reasons which these two ‘co-original’ 
theories of normative legitimacy provide in attempting to understand, and particularly respond to, crises of 
legitimacy.  The reasons offered up by republicanism and liberalism respective ly for the legitimacy of an 
authority can be organized by focusing on the distinct ways in which republicanism and liberalism 
problematize authority.  This can be understood by reference to what has called been called Lenin’s 
question: where does political power come from, how is political power exercised and what is political 
power used for?137  which can be rephrased as concerns about the origins, the aims and the methods of 
political power.   
Republican theory has traditionally been more concerned with both the ‘who?’ and the ‘whose 
benefit?’ question.  This is clear in the dominant role of ‘the public’ in republican theory both as the source 
as well as the telos of political power to achieve the core republican value of ‘freedom as non-
domination’.138   As such, predominantly republican-inspired constitutional concepts and ideals such as the 
idea of a ‘constituent power’139 as the legitimate source of constitutional order, the idea of ‘self-legislation’ 
as one of the primordial values of legitimate government and appeals the common good representing the 
                                                                 
136 Tully, (n 114 ) 209. 
137  In Guess’ formulation:  ‘who does what to whom, for whose benefit’? . Guess, Philosophy and Real Politics, 
(Princeton UP, 2008), 25.  See also M Wilkinson, ’Political Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2013) 76(2) 
MLR 191, 222. 
138 Pettit (n 115). 
139 For general discussion see M. Loughlin and N. Walker, The Paradox of Constitutionalism:  Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). 
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dictates of a ‘general will’140 can be seen to reflect a preoccupation with the origins and aims of political 
power.  The ‘what?’ question tends to attract more focus from liberalism and particularly the ways and 
procedures through which political power is exercised and the extent of the limits on the exercise of that 
power.  As such, liberalism traditionally privileges the morality of freedom and autonomy , classically 
interpreted as non-interference,141 as operationalized though legal structures and processes.  
In short, in developing a framework of reasons for the legitimacy of public power, in the Western 
Constitutional Tradition the tension between liberalism and republicanism can be said to problematize, and 
offer solutions to, questions surrounding the legitimacy of the origins, aims and methods of political power. 
In this way, the collection of practices, values, tropes and principles of constitutionalism drawn from liberal 
and republican theory can be (re)presented in a broader framework of constitutionalism as legitimacy in 
terms of a series of responses to questions surrounding these three dimensions.  Figure 1 provides an 
illustration of how these common dimensions of constitutionalism can be organized into a framework of 
constitutional legitimacy:  
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141 Bellamy (n 118) , 156-159. 
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Fig. 1   
The framework of Constitutionalism as Legitimacy 
Authority 
Origins Aims Methods 
 
Constituent power 
the people 
the nation 
the crown 
God 
The demos 
 
 
 
 
 
Salus populi 
Common good 
Ordre public 
public policy 
public interest 
the national interest 
human rights 
democracy 
 
 
 
Legal system 
rule by law 
rule of law 
legality 
human rights  
democracy 
the separation of powers 
 
 
From this table, it can seen how the various interventions in constitutional debates can be 
plotted according to the particular dimensions of political power with which they are particularly 
concerned.  For example, approaches to constitutionalism which use the concept of constitutionalism to 
argue for, among other things, the promotion of particular values such as the rule of law, due process, 
fundamental rights protection or the separation of powers142 are honing in on the question of the 
legitimacy of the methods of the exercise of authority.  In doing so they reflect the more liberal end of the 
                                                                 
142 Such as many of the interventions in global constitutional debates see Kumm (n 4), Peters (n 11), Cohen (n 11),  A. 
O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalism (CUP, 2014). 
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Western Constitutional Tradition.  On the other hand, the ‘foundational’143 conception of constitutionalism 
which informs many of the skeptical positions to the idea of global constitutionalism, resonates more 
strongly with the question of the legitimate origins of political power and its consequences of institutional 
decision-making along democratic lines, reflecting the more republican dimensions of the tradition.   
However what the framework makes clear, is that these are  both tendencies within a 
broader tradition which views the political theories that inspire these positions as ‘equiprimordial’144 or 
‘equally basic’.145  This ‘equiprimordiality’ is not only historical but also normative.146  It is, moreover, 
evident in the overlaps between the different dimensions of the framework.  For example, the idea of a 
legal system and the rule of law in method, overlaps with aims in that the existence of a functioning stable 
legal system which contributes to social order can be said to contribute to the common good.  Origins can 
overlap with aims in particular contexts in the respect in which the subjects of the aims of political power 
can be said, rhetorically speaking, to be the ‘people’ which established the power.    The overlap between 
origins and methods becomes clear in the core idea of ‘authorship’147 where the emphasis on a single 
source of law granting the validity of the individual norms of a system of positive law resonates with the 
postulating of the people as the legitimate authors of the law in particular contexts as expressed in the 
process of legislation by representative assembly.  
The overlap is made more apparent in the way in which the same values can be concerned 
with different dimensions of public power.  In the scheme above, for example, human rights can be seen as 
a liberally-infused limit in terms of the legitimacy of the methods of public power but it can, and does in 
practice, also feature in republican aims of public power, in that the protection of fundamental rights can 
                                                                 
143 Krisch (n 4), 28 . 
144 Tully (n 114), 207. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Tully (n 114) FN 88. 
147 F Michelman, ‘Constitutional Authorship’ in L Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism:  Philosophical Perspectives (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1998). 
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be considered to be part of the common or public good.148  Perhaps more strikingly, the protean value of 
democracy can be linked to all three dimensions; republican-inspired ideas such as constituent power can 
provide a powerful justificatory prop for subjecting decision-making to democratic institutions while some 
(particularly liberal) readings of legitimate aims see democratic procedure as the ultimate expression of the 
common good.149  Democracy has also been posited as a necessary condition of a theory of a normatively 
desirable theory of law.150   
Bringing the various values associated with constitutionalism together in this way to reveal 
the links as well as the tensions between them is of considerable normative value. The close relationship 
between republicanism and liberalism in the tradition as well as the discursive ‘reasons’ they offer for the 
legitimacy of political power means that when considering particular issues of constitutional value, such as 
the rule of law or fundamental rights in methods in order to think about the legitimacy of authority more 
broadly, we must keep the other, potentially competing, reasons offered by origins and aims in the frame.  
Changes in one particular dimension can, and usually will, have an impact on the achievement of the 
others, and the extent and nature of this impact will, in turn, impact upon the legitimacy of the exercise of 
authority more generally.  Thus, for example, arguments for the introduction of ‘reasons’ of method (such 
as rule of law values) to enhance the legitimacy of particular exercises of authority must contend with 
reasons relating to legitimate origins and aims such as democratic or policy-based arguments.  This is 
particularly clear when the reason-giving by an authority is contested.  The impact of the justification for a 
decision on the other potential justifications for authority means that they can be mobilized to contest the 
original justificatory basis of an exercise of authority. 
 In this way the framework shows how constitutional values are not ‘freestanding’ or ‘time 
free’ axiomatic goods applicable in the same way in all contexts.  Rather, notwithstanding the universalistic 
                                                                 
148 In this regard, Bellamy’s republican account of political constitutionalism is concerned with the protection of 
fundamental rights.  Bellamy (n 118). 
149 Mill  (n 120), Waldron (n 124). 
150 See for example, J. Waldron, ‘Can there be a Democratic Jurisprudence?’ (2008) Emory L. J. 675.  
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tendencies of the constitutional values distilled from liberalism and republicanism, they operate in 
particular factual contexts where other, competing, liberal and/or republican-inspired constitutional values 
will be advanced as requiring equal or more respect which will be contested and debated in ongoing 
discourses regarding the legitimacy of a particular authority.  Much of the way in which the discourse 
progresses will depend on the exogenous ‘facts’ of the constitutional context which will shape and 
structure the ensuing normative discourse. 
IV. ‘Constitutionalism as Legitimacy’ Beyond the State  
Walker identifies three  requirements for the  ‘basis of translation’ of the concept of constitutionalism 
between the state and suprastate levels; relevance, generality and normative salience.151  The requirement 
of relevance demands that the translation is ‘sensitive to a sufficiently ‘thick’ understanding of each local 
context’152; the requirement of generality involves the idea that the translated concept must have some 
explanatory purchase in all contexts and the requirement of normative salience requires that 
constitutionalism retains its nature as a form of practical reasoning, providing ‘solutions’ to questions of 
legitimacy in the contexts to which it applied.153  The conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy 
presented here, it is submitted, fulfills these three requirements of translation allowing for it to provide 
insights into questions of legitimacy in global governance.  Given that it shows the links between different 
and countervailing reasons for legitimacy, moreover, it does so in a way which brings order to, rather than 
replicates, the cacophony.    
Firstly, the criteria of relevance, it is submitted, is implicated in the factual dimension of 
constitutionalism as legitimacy.  As noted above, constitutionalism as legitimacy presupposes a 
sociologically factual practice of authority to which the legitimating discourse of reason-giving and 
contestation can be applied.  As such, the relevant setting for constitutionalism in the context of global 
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governance can be the structures established in a treaty regime, convergent submission to an authority by 
states or the decisions of suprastate intuitions. This means that the peculiar circumstances of particular 
local contexts of governance are already ‘pre-loaded’ into the conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy 
complying with the ‘relevance’ criteria for translation.  Secondly, with regard to the ‘generality’ criteria, 
constitutionalism as legitimacy is sufficiently general to aid understanding of legitimacy questions in 
different sites of governance whether state, sub-state or suprastate.  In the context of de facto authorities, 
therefore, it helps to explain why a de facto authority such as a global governance institution is successful in 
having its subjects (in the global governance context usually states) comply with its directives .  Finally, 
constitutionalism as legitimacy also contains the resources for the critique of a de facto authority such as a 
global governance institution for failing to comply with particular normative benchmarks such as due 
process, lack of participation in decision-making or substandard review procedures.  In this way 
constitutionalism as legitimacy contains the resources for prescriptions for reform of particular authorities 
undergoing, or at risk of, legitimacy crises.  That constitutionalism as legitimacy successfully fulfills Walker’s 
criteria for translation to the global level can be illustrated by applying the framework to an area which has 
attracted much interest from global constitutional scholars: the activities of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) and in particular its ‘war on terror’. 154 
Constitutionalism as Legitimacy and Global Governance: The Case of the United Nations Security Council 
 As noted, constitutionalism as legitimacy allows analytical insight as well as resources for critique of de 
facto authorities in a way which is sensitive to the relevant context whether state or suprastate.  It does 
this by identifying not only the legitimacy deficits of particular sites of political power such as global 
governance institutions, a common theme in global constitutional literature, but also their legitimacy 
                                                                 
154 See generally, E. de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, (Hart, Oxford, 2004), K. 
Schepple, The International State of Emergency: Constitutional Exceptions and the Globalization of Security Law 
after 9/11, Cohen (n 11).  The ‘Kadi’ saga which involved the implementation of UNSC resolutions by the European 
Union has become a key element in global constitutional debates and has spawned a l iterature all  of its own.  See 
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credits.  It can perform this function by identifying and classifying the particular ‘reasons’ why actually 
existing and effective (global) authorities are generally obeyed in the first instance.  Frequently questions of 
legitimacy in global governance focus on legitimacy deficits at the cost of recognizing the ways in which the 
exercise of political power by global governance institutions may be considered to be legitimate, 
notwithstanding these particular legitimacy deficits.  As Steffek notes, ‘if international organisations can 
suffer a legitimacy crisis […] after many decades of existence this somehow implies that they have been 
regarded as legitimate before’.155  In this way we can make more sense of the ways in which the legitimacy 
of the UN Security Council and particularly its war on terror, has been contested in recent times. 
The ‘activism’ of the UNSC since the end of the cold war, and particularly its role in the ‘war on terror’ 
has been well documented and has attracted considerable attention in global constitutional literature .156  
This activism has primarily involved a shift in its activities as a primarily administrative and executive body 
to adopting more legislative measures in the aftermath of the terror attacks in the US on 11 September 
2001.157  Its activities during this period have been the subject of considerable critique, based on the 
‘radical’158 unauthorized expansion in its powers as well as the lack of procedural safeguards such as the 
presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, equality of arms, and rights to property and free 
movement.159 Constitutionalism, particularly in its ‘liberal-legal’160 guise, has been primarily employed in 
this context in a prescriptive or ‘shaping’ form as a way of critiquing UNSC’s activities in this area.161  
However, constitutionalism as legitimacy outlined above can add to these contributions by showing the 
complexities of the question of legitimacy in such contexts, and in particular the ways in which  the UNSC’s 
activities could be said to be legitimate as well as illegitimate. Rather than viewing the activities of the 
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157 De Wet, (n 154).  
158 Cohen (n 11),  267. 
159 For a general discussion see the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi 
and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351.  See also Cohen, (n 11), 
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161 See, for example, Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion of 16 January 2008 in Kadi (n 159).   
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UNSC, and perhaps more importantly its legitimacy, exclusively through a focus on constitutional values 
such as the rule of law or fundamental rights, the framework provided by constitutionalism as legitimacy 
allows us to plot these interventions in debates about the UNSC’s activities within a broader understanding 
of the Western Constitutional Tradition as a specific form of legitimacy, as well as capture more clearly the 
complexity of the issues of the legitimacy of the UNSC raised by its anti -terrorism measures.  
  In the first instance, in this context constitutionalism as legitimacy forces us to think of the 
evaluation of relatively uncontested dimensions the UNSC’s power; that is in terms of the way in which it 
currently enjoys legitimacy.  The UNSC can be considered a successful  de authority; as the UN’s Counter-
terrorism Committee itself notes, the rate of compliance with these counter-terrorism measures by states 
has been extraordinarily high,162 which speaks at least to some perception of the legitimacy of the UNSC by 
states.  To recall and slightly recast Steffek’s point above, if the UNSC can suffer legitimacy problems from a 
substantive rule of law perspective, this cannot not mean that its legitimacy tout court has always been in 
question.  Rather the rate of compliance and relative stability of its authority speak to a legitimacy 
explicable by factors other than these accounts of constitutionalism, which the framework of the 
constitutionalism as legitimacy divided into origins, aims and methods can provide.  In terms of looking for 
ways in which the legitimacy of UNSC’s activities in this area can be perceived to be legitimate by the 
constituent states of the UN in the framework of constitutionalism as legitimacy, we need look no further 
than the recitals to the two resolutions most central to the terrorist-listing regime, 1267 (1999)163 and 1373 
(2001).164  Both of these instruments justify the draconian measures of terrorist listing by reference to the 
maintenance and preservation of ‘international peace and security’ 165.  As such, a strong factor in the 
UNSC’s legitimacy in this context, due to its relatively uncontested nature, is the legitimacy of its aims, the 
                                                                 
162 Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) by member states , Counter-
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‘global public good’ of international peace and security166, an aim of public power which has been central to 
the legitimacy of states.167  Reasons for the UNSC’s legitimacy in its ‘war on terror’ are also present in the 
resolutions in their appeal to the legal authority of the UN Charter, and Chapter VII in particular, in 
executing its counter-terrorist programme.168  This ‘global state of emergency’ as developed by the UNSC’s 
war on terror is formally legal169 making it very hard to ‘make the ultra vires argument.’170 As such, the 
framework also serves to highlight the legitimacy of the methods of the UNSC in respect of the formal 
legality of its actions through ideas of rule by law.171 
 Against this backdrop of the uncontested aspects of the UNSC’s activities, the framework 
also allows for the more common critiques of the activities of the UNSC to be put in context, that is 
critiques based on substantive legality and ‘guarantisme’ constitutionalism,172 including the rule of law, due 
process, judicial review and human rights considerations.173  Not only does this allow for a more nuanced 
understanding of questions of the (il)legitimacy of the UNSC in the context of its war on terror, but it also 
allows for a more effective method of critique, in identifying and clearly exposing the counter-positions to a 
critique based on substantive legality.  
Given the discursive conception of legitimacy upon which the framework is based, t he 
question of the UNSC’s legitimacy or otherwise will ultimately be thrashed out in the ongoing negotiation 
and renegotiation of the legitimacy of its particular political and legal practices and their evaluation by its 
primary constituencies, the constituent states of the UN, and also increasingly non-state actors such as 
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NGOs and supranational bodies like the EU.174  The dimensions of the legitimacy as well as the illegitimacy 
of the UNSC’s activities feed into this discursive (re)negotiation and how this plays out, and in particular 
which dimension of political power is prioritized, will ultimately depend on the dynamics and character of 
the relationship and the extent to which its legitimacy is contested. The success of one particular form of 
legitimacy such as substantive legality will be evidenced by a change in the practices of the UNSC and will 
ultimately depend on the extent to which the critical discourse of substantive legitimate methods gains 
sufficient traction.  As is well known, the critique of substantive legality has borne fruit having been 
canvassed by certain UN Member states as well as other actors such as the Court of Justice of the European 
Union,175 resulting in increased –but still limited - oversight to the listing procedure through the 
establishment of an Ombudsperson.176  
In cases such as this one, what the framework highlights is that in the combination of the stability and 
success of certain global governance institutions and critiques of their practices, that legitimacy is a more 
complex phenomenon than is often recognized in global constitutional discourses.  This complexity means 
that the questions of the legitimacy of global governance, to which global constitutionalism is oriented, will 
not yield simple zero-sum answers. Rather, what constitutionalism as legitimacy emphasizes is that 
authority can be legitimate in some senses but not in others, according to some dimensions of public power 
but not others, more legitimate from a liberal perspective but not a republican one.  As such, the 
framework of constitutionalism based on this tension provides a useful tool by which to approach the 
complexity of the question of legitimacy in global governance by appraising both the legitimacy as well as 
the illegitimacy of the various political relationships and sites of public power which make up th is 
phenomenon.   
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Moreover, In this way, constitutionalism as legitimacy serves to impose order on the global 
constitutional cacophony.  Each of the various interventions in global constitutional debates such as the 
‘constitutional’ critiques of the UNSC’s ‘war on terror’  can be plotted on the framework of constitutionalism 
as legitimacy in terms of different reasons problematizing different dimensions of authority whether 
origins, aims or methods.  The framework also helps to identify and trace the overlaps and relationships 
between different reasons qua conceptions of constitutionalism in global constitutional debates which 
helps provide some order and orientation to the cacophony.  This helps orient the debate away from binary 
solutions such as constitutional/unconstitutional to more directly address the substantive questions of 
legitimacy which animate global constitutional discourse.   
V. Some Residual Skepticism? 
The framework of reasons entailed in constitutionalism as legitimacy, as argued above, serves to put 
some order on the global constitutional cacophony by categorizing the different conceptions of 
constitutionalism which inform the debate and emphasizing the relationship between them, not least their 
‘equiprimordial’177 nature and common root in a ‘Western Constitutional Tradition.’  However, if the 
cacophony can be ordered in this way, does this mean that the skepticism of which it was argued that the 
cacophony was symptomatic, can also be addressed?  Does constitutionalism as legitimacy effectively deal 
with the quartet of suprastate constitutional skepticism?  Can it take at least some of the sting of the 
alleged impossibility, inconceivability, improbability and illegitimacy of bringing constitutionalism beyond 
the state?   It is submitted that it can.   
 Firstly, the impossibility and related inconceivability objections to suprastate 
constitutionalism entailed the idea that the state provides such a unique context with unique problems and 
a unique ‘epistemic horizon’178 to which the concept of constitutionalism was uniquely tailored, making its 
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transportation beyond the state problematic.  Whereas it is true that much suprastate governance is 
functionally limited to pursue particular policies such as trade, human rights or security , the lack of 
comprehensive ‘sovereignty’ in at least formal terms does not negative their status as authorities and their 
susceptibility to justification (and critique) along the lines of their origins, aims and methods.  Neither their 
functionally limited competence, nor their suprastate context, makes these questions disappear.  Indeed, 
much of the legitimacy crisis surrounding many global governance institutions testify precisely to the 
ongoing presence and relevance of these different grounds of legiti macy in global governance. 
  Constitutionalism as legitimacy addresses this twin skepticism through its emphasis on the questions to 
which constitutionalism is designed as the answer: the legitimacy of authority.  This necessarily involves a 
measure of abstraction from particular expressions of constitutional practices in states to the 
problematization of authority more generally.  Once abstracted in this way the differences between state 
and non-state contexts begin to recede, allowing us to see familiar questions between state and suprastate 
authorities to which constitutionalism can be put to use without foundering on the specificity of particular 
constitutional arrangements in particular state settings.  
 The improbability objection, that all law and politics is, in the final analysis reducible to the 
state system and its legitimating tendencies making the idea of suprastate constitutional authority 
‘improbable’, is elided by constitutionalism as legitimacy and its focus on substantive questions of 
legitimacy.  The improbability objection fails to take the ‘post-Westphalian world’ and the legitimacy 
problems affecting it seriously.  That a global governance institution is not, nor can ever aspire to be, a 
state is neither analytically interesting nor relevant to the contemporary legitimacy problems which these 
types of authorities face.  More problematically, to argue or assume that the problems with, for example, 
the UNSC’s terrorist listing procedures is either not a ‘real’ problem given that states st ill exist, or that it is 
ultimately resolvable by states, seems anachronistic, or naïve or both.     
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Finally, and perhaps most prominently, constitutionalism as legitimacy meets the illegitimacy 
objection to suprastate constitutionalism head-on.  As noted, the issue of the illegitimacy of suprastate 
constitutionalism involves the charge of sanctifying that which ought not to be sanctified.179  That is, given 
constitutionalism’s conventional use as a proxy for legitimacy, the emaciated or tendentious nature of 
much suprastate governance is not deserving of this symbolic legitimating label.180 Some take this critique 
further, arguing that much suprastate and global governance has particular ideological leanings in a neo -
liberal direction which are shielded from contestation and are therefore not deserving of the legitimacy 
associated with constitutionalism.181  Approaches to suprastate constitutionalism which attempt to 
‘parse’182 the concept to tailor it to the context of global governance, it is submitted, are primarily 
responsible for this type of suprastate constitutional skepticism.  These approaches disaggregate the 
diverse elements of the ‘Western Constitutional Tradition’ such that only certain aspects of the broader 
idea are exported to the suprastate level.183  However constitutionalism as legitimacy avoids this critique by 
employing the western constitutional tradition in toto at the suprastate level.  Stressing the 
‘equiprimordiality’184 of liberalism and republicanism in the Western constitutional tradition and stressing 
the interrelationships between them, constitutionalism as legitimacy does not privilege or attempt to 
promote any particular expression of either theory in considering questions of legitimacy beyond the state.  
Rather than promoting  an idea of constitutionalism as one tendentious panacea to problems of global 
legitimacy, it provides an organisation of reasons for the legitimacy of authority which can be used to gauge 
the legitimacy credits and deficits of individual sites of governance.  In this way constitutionalism as 
legitimacy is quite balanced.  
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VI. Conclusion 
Constitutionalism as legitimacy encourages us to interpret the various conceptions of constitutionalism in 
global constitutional discourse as reflecting elements of a broader Western constitutional tradition 
involving a particular historical way of thinking about questions of the legitimacy of authority.  The 
conflicts, incoherence or even mutual disengagement of different conceptions of constitutionalism in global 
constitutional discourse can be interpreted as an expression of the tensions within the core normative 
component of this tradition; the tension between liberal and republican theory and the different 
dimensions of political power they emphasize.  This results in a useful account of constitutionalism which 
can order the global ‘constitutional cacophony’ and contribute to understanding  as well as set about 
addressing the legitimacy crisis in global governance.  
 Krisch, considering the issue of suprastate constitutionalism notes in skeptical tones, that,185  
‘We tend to fill voids with what we know. When we are thrown into unfamiliar spaces, we try to chart them 
with the maps we possess, construct them with the tools we already have. Working with analogies, 
extending and adapting existing concepts, seems usually preferable to the creation of ideas and structures 
from scratch, not only because of the risks involved in the latter, but also becaus e of our limits of 
imagination.  When we try to imagine the post national space, it is not surprising then that we turn for 
guidance first to the well known, the space of the national’  
Whereas Krisch opens with these reflections as the prelude to his critique of the idea of 
global constitutionalism, here they are presented as its vindication.  The tendency to draw on the known to 
deal with the unknown is entirely natural and legitimate.  Indeed, it is arguably an epistemological 
necessity; in the history of ideas, there is no view from nowhere.186   
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In taking legitimacy seriously in the context of global governance we are always building the 
ship at sea.  As such we will, by necessity, fall back on the ways in which these forms of authority have 
conventionally been understood in its most prominent and most familiar form, that is within state 
practices.  Therefore, rather than reinventing the wheel on legitimacy to the changed circumstances of 
global governance as some propose, the constitutionalism as legitimacy, given its reliance on a tradition 
does ‘our thinking […] for us and […] ahead of time’.187  Traditions, such as the Western Constitutional 
Tradition, operationalized into the conception of constitutionalism as legitimacy therefore, provide us with 
‘storehouses of possibly relevant analogies to our present problems ’ in global governance as well as ‘ways 
of thinking about such problems, and successful and unsuccessful attempts to solve them. ’ 188   This 
considerable experience of thinking about power, authority and legitimacy entailed in the conception of 
constitutionalism as legitimacy provides a ready-made toolkit to start to think about and address the 
inevitable welter of ongoing legitimacy questions which will  continue to emerge in the transition to a ‘new 
world order’.   
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